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COMMENT
Voluntary Restraint Agreements: Effects and
Implications of the Steel and Auto Cases
"Free trade," writes George Will, "ranks just below Christianity
and just above jogging on the list of things constantly praised but
only sporadically practiced."' Nowhere is this ambivalence towards
free trade more apparent than in the increased utilization of volun-
tary restraint agreements.
In the years following World War II, when its economic domi-
nance went unchallenged, the United States led the fight for freer
international trade, hoping to avoid a repeat of the disastrous trade
wars of the 1930s.2 Through the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade,3 tariffs have been lowered, many restrictions have been re-
moved, and institutions, procedures, and rules governing interna-
tional trade have been established. As a proponent of free trade, the
United States is committed to GATT's governing principles, includ-
ing those granting most-favored nation status to all signatories and
prohibiting quotas and discriminatory treatment in international
commerce. 4 U.S. law reflects GATT's authorization of import quo-
tas only "where products are being imported . . .in such increased
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious
injury to domestic producers . . . of like or directly competitive
products." 5
Developments in recent years have come to endanger the U.S.
post-war love affair with free trade. U.S. manufacturers and labor
I Will, Great Nations Do What They Must Do, Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1985, at F8, col. 5.
2 See R. HUDEC, THE GAT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DiPtOMAcy 4-6
(1975).
3 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GAIT].
4 See Comment, Regulating Japanese Automobile Imports: Some Implications of the Voluntary
Quota System, 5 B.C. INrr'L & COMP. L. REv. 431, 439-41 (1982).
5 See GATT, supra note 3, at art. xix; Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251
(1982). Section 201 requires that parties seeking import restraints submit a petition for
eligibility for import relief to the U.S. Trade Commission (ITC). The ITC then deter-
mines whether increased imports are "a substantial cause of serious injury to a domestic
industry producing articles similar to or directly competitive with, the imported article."
Id "If the Commission finds a 'substantial cause of serious injury,' it makes a recommen-
dation to the President who then determines if, and in what form, he will grant import
relief." Comment, supra note 4, at 438.
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unions are screaming for relief from imports, 6 as the trade deficit has
now surpassed $100 billion, the dollar has reached record-high
levels, and industry profits and employment remain depressed in
many sectors of the economy.7 The U.S. Government is torn be-
tween its policy of free trade and various political, economic, and
strategic considerations which create pressure for restrictions.
The response to this dilemma, as evidenced by events of the past
four years, has been a dramatic increase in the negotiation of volun-
tary restraint agreements. "A voluntary restraint agreement is a ne-
gotiated arrangement whereby an exporting country voluntarily
agrees to limit its exports by means of legislation or other manner of
enforcement within the exporting country."8 Through such agree-
ments, the United States has attempted to protect industries from
imports without creating the appearance of protectionism.
This comment first explains the structure and function of volun-
tary restraint agreements (VRAs) by comparing VRAs to quotas and
other import restrictions. The comment then traces the develop-
ment and use of VRAs to the present time, concentrating on two
industries vital to the U.S. economy, the automobile and steel indus-
tries. Next, this comment details the effects of VRAs on protected
industries, consumers, and the world trading system. The lessons of
past experiences with VRAs are analyzed to determine whether
VRAs are a satisfactory means of achieving U.S. industrial goals or
whether they merely exacerbate existing problems. The comment
concludes that VRAs are important and helpful tools in certain situa-
tions and offers a list of factors that decision makers should weigh in
determining whether to employ VRAs.
6 Industries seeking relief from foreign competition in recent years include steel (see
Farnsworth, Reagan Seeks Cut in Steel Imports Through Accords, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1984, at
Al, col. 6) [hereinafter cited as Reagan Seeks Cuts]; automobiles (see Auerbach, Dingell Plans
Bill To Limit Imports, Wash. Post, Jan. 31, 1985, at El, col. 2); textiles (Lawrence, US Imports
of Textiles Jump 32%, J. Com., Nov. 2, 1984, at 3A, col. 4); copper (Farnsworth, Reagan
Denies Import Protection to Domestic Producers of Copper, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1984, at Al, col.
2); machine tools (Letter to Editor from James A. Gray, Imports that Threaten a Vital Tool of
National Security, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1984, at A22, col. 4); television sets, footwear, beef,
and pork (Munger, America's Costly Trade Bar-ers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1983, at A21, col. 1).
7 See Auerbach, Trade Deficit Tops $100 Billion. Baldridge Sees Improvement in 1985,
Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1984, at GI, col. 5; Has the Dollar Dealt a Body Blow to U.S. Industry?. Bus.
WK., Oct. 15, 1984, at 24; Berry, Slogans Blur Trade Picture, Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1985, at Al.
col. 5.
8 deKieffer, Antitrust and the Japanese Auto Quotas, 8 BROOKLYN J. lrr'L L. 59, 63 n.28
(1982). A VRA "is to be distinguished from an orderly marketing agreement (OMA),
whereby an agreement to limit imports is enforced through action of the importing coun-
try .... " /d.
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I. Background
A. Comparison with Other Import Restrictions
Although VRAs are similar in effect to quotas, 9 exporting na-
tions, if given a choice, prefer VRAs. The voluntary system offers
more flexibility than the quota system. Quota levels need not be
completely fixed, because the exporting country "retains some con-
trol in establishing quota levels and in raising ceilings on the volume
of goods imported each year."' 0 VRAs generally apply for a limited
period of time, after which new agreements must be negotiated.II
VRAs reduce the net loss to the exporting nation because the export-
ing nation can enforce the restrictions by means of export restric-
tions which generate revenue that the exporting nation can channel
back into its economy.' 2 A quota or tariff, on the other hand, gener-
ates revenue for the importing nation through duties or import li-
cense fees.' 3
VRAs can also be preferable to the importing country because
they lessen the danger of retaliation against U.S. exporters under
worldwide trade rules.' 4
B. Implementation: Parties and Enforcement
A voluntary restraint agreement is the product of negotiations
between an exporting nation of a private exporter and the importing
nation or the threatened industry.' 5 U.S. antitrust law, however, for-
bids anti-competitive, private-interest agreements.' 6 An agreement
between a U.S. industry and a foreign exporter would run a substan-
tial risk of violating U.S. antitrust law.' 7 Agreements between the
executive branch and a foreign industry would also expose the ex-
porter and collusive domestic parties to liability under the Sherman
Act. Because the President is powerless, absent congressional au-
thorization, to enforce a VRA domestically, such an agreement
would be essentially private and thus subject to the antitrust laws.' 8
The third type of VRA, that between the exporting and import-
ing governments, is shielded from U.S. antitrust law by the "foreign
9 See Farnsworth, "Voluntary" Import Restraints: Effect Similar to Quotas, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 20, 1984, at Dl, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Effect Similar to Quotas].
10 Comment, supra note 4, at 434.
11 Id at 433-34.
12 See Lizondo, A Note on the Nonequivalence of Import Barrers and Voluntary Export Re-
straints, 16J. INT'L ECON., Feb. 1984, at 183. Revenue is generated through the granting of
export licenses or the imposition of an export tax. Id at 184.
13 Id
14 Effect Similar to Quotas, supra note 9, at DIg, col. 1.
15 Comment, supra note 4, at 447.
16 Id at 448. See also Lehner, How Japan Would Enact "Voluntary Quotas," Wall St. J.,
Mar. 15, 1985, at 24, col. 4.
17 Comment, supra note 4, at 448.
18 Id at 449-50.
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compulsion" defense or the "act of state" doctrine.1 9 An exporter
may escape antitrust liability when a foreign government compels
compliance with a VRA.20 The government must actually compel
the conduct in question. Mere governmental request, acquiescence,
or approval would be insufficient grounds for claiming the foreign
compulsion defense. 2'
Under the act of state doctrine, a court will not examine the va-
lidity of an act of a foreign sovereign done within the territory of the
sovereign. 22 "[I]f a government participates in implementing an
agreement, to the extent that the actions of the private parties are
tantamount to those of the sovereign, antitrust liability will not
attach." 23
Because treble damages are available under U.S. antitrust laws,
parties to a VRA "should obtain the direct, articulated commitment
of the exporting country to enforce the VRA, rather than rely on
informal government encouragement or private discretion." 24
C. Implementation: Negotiation
The term "voluntary restraint agreement" is a misnomer, for no
country will ordinarily restrain its own exports voluntarily.2 5 Rather,
nations restrict their exports in response to threats, implicit or ex-
plicit, that in the absence of voluntary restraints, the importing na-
tion will enact restrictive measures on its own.26 Most exporting
19 I, at 451.
20 Id. In Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1292 (D.
Del. 1970), "[t]he court reasoned that the Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction on
United States courts over acts of business which a nation compels." Id See also deKieffer,
supra note 8, at 69.
21 Comment, supra note 4, at 451-52.
22 deKieffer, supra note 8, at 64 n.32. The rationale for the act of state doctrine rests
on considerations of the proper relations between sovereigns. Lehner, supra note 16, at
24, cols. 5-6. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964);
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
23 Comment, supra note 4, at 452; deKieffer, supra note 8, at 66.
24 Comment, supra note 4, at 453.
25 According to a representative of a foreign steel industry, this type of volunteering
"is like when you hand over your wallet with a gun pointed at your head." Efect Similar to
Quotas, supra note 9, at D19, col. 1.
26 An example of an implicit threat is the Japanese decision after the VRA on autos
expired to hold exports to the United States at 2.3 million units per year despite estimates
that 2.7 million units could be sold. See Brown, Import Ceiling Seen "Desined to Make Every-
body Mad," Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 1985, at El, col. 6. Japan limited exports because of fear
that rapid growth in the number of automobiles it sold in the United States would
heighten trade tensions and encourage protectionist members of Congress. See Burgess,
Japanese Still Feel Need to Curb Car Exports to U.S., Wash. Post, Feb. 23, 1985, at AI, col. 5.
Use of explicit threats to gain voluntary restrictions is demonstrated by the U.S. negotia-
tions since September 1984 of VRAs with all the major steel exporting nations. To ensure
cooperation, a twelve-page list of all the "unfair" trade practices of about every steel-
producing nation was prepared. Any country that refused to "volunteer" could be penal-
ized under U.S. unfair trade practice law by the imposition of higher tariffs on their ship-
ments to U.S. ports. See Effect Similar to Quotas. supra note 9, at DI, col. 3. By March 1985,
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countries prefer VRAs to quotas or tariffs, 27 and are therefore willing
to restrict exports voluntarily. VRAs are preferable because export
restraint figures are established through negotiation rather than uni-
lateral action of the importing nation. 28
H. Use of VRAs in Auto and Steel Industries
The United States has utilized voluntary restraint agreements
for over thirty years in numerous industries. 29 This comment exam-
ines VRAs with respect to two of those industries, steel and
automobiles. These industries are chosen for three reasons:
(1) their importance to the U.S. economy; (2) the resulting wealth of
information available on the state of the steel and auto industries;
and (3) the author's view that the lessons drawn from voluntary re-
straint agreements involving steel and autos will also apply to VRAs
in other industries.
A. Auto Import Restraints
The U.S. auto industry uses a substantial percentage of the raw
materials consumed domestically.30 Moreover, twenty percent of the
total U.S. work force is directly or indirectly employed by the auto
industry. 3' Until quite recently autos kept some 30,000 suppliers
healthy through $40 billion a year of purchase orders.32 The indus-
try accounted for roughly eight percent of the Gross National Prod-
uct and twenty-five percent of total U.S. retail sales.33 As the
repository of immense productive capacity and extensive technologi-
cal sophistication, the automobile industry remains-as it was during
World War II-a prime guarantor of national security through its
ability to shift to the production of military equipment.34 It contin-
ues in its historical role as a technological innovator.35 In sum, the
auto industry is immensely important to the national welfare.
Prior to World War II direct international trade in autos was
agreements had been reached with eight foreign suppliers of steel, and negotiations were
continuing with six others. See Auerbach, Steel Imports Seen Rising Despite Plan, Wash. Post,
Mar. 15, 1985, at D2, col. I [hereinafter cited as Steel Imports].
27 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
28 Effect Similar to Quotas, supra note 9, at DI, col. 3.
29 See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
30 See Note, Escape Clause Causation After the Auto Case: 1.8 MiLlion Japanese Imports as Les
than a Substantial Cause of Injury, 16 G.WJ. OF INT'L L. & EcON. 299, 299 (1982). The auto
industry "uses approximately 25% of the steel, 50% of the molded iron, 33% of the zinc,
17% of the aluminum, 13% of the copper, and 60% of the synthetic rubber produced in
the United States." Id
S Id
32 W. ABERNATHY, K. CLAR & A. KANTmow, INDUSTRIAL RENAISSANCE 13 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL RENAISSANCE].
3S Id
34 Id
35 Id
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insignificant.3 6 After the war, changing consumer preferences in the
United States and the formation of the European Community (EC)
prompted much higher levels of trade.3 7 Volkswagen established a
beachhead in the U.S. market in the mid-1950s.38 During the 1960s
trade in autos grew at a striking pace; by 1970 a full fifteen percent of
domestic car sales were of foreign-produced autos.39 Unable to
achieve sufficient economies in materials, design, or production to
offer a low-priced small car that returned a decent profit, U.S. manu-
facturers seemed content to abandon the small car market to foreign
producers.40
The 1970s were marked by continued growth in auto imports,
sparked by oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 and the resultant shift in
demand from large cars to small, fuel-efficient models. 4 1 Increasing
perceptions of the superior quality of foreign autos,42 and a decreas-
ing ability of U.S. auto makers to compete with more efficient foreign
production methods lowered domestic auto sales.43 The major ben-
eficiaries of these changed conditions were Japanese auto producers,
who increased their exports to the United States fivefold between
1970 and 1980,44 capturing twenty-two percent of the U.S. car mar-
ket in the process. This occurred at a time when domestic sales
slipped from a 1977 high of 11.4 million units to 8.975 million units
in 1980, a decline of twenty-one percent. 45 Meanwhile, automobile
layoffs reached 250,000 persons by August 1980.46 The U.S. auto
industry was in deep trouble.
In the summer of 1980, the United Autoworkers of America and
Ford Motor Company filed petitions with the International Trade
Commission (ITC), pursuant to section 201 of the Trade Act of
1974,47 alleging that increased imports of automobiles from Japan
were "a substantial cause of serious injury" to the U.S. auto indus-
36 Id at 47.
37 Id
38 Id
39 Id.
40 See id at 5 1-56.
41 Note, supra note 30, at 299.
42 See INDUSTRIAL RENAISSANCE, supra note 32, at 63-66.
43 See id at 57-63. Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow estimate the Japanese cost advan-
tage to be $1,500 per car, an estimate that is generally accepted as accurate. See, e.g.,
Lehner, Keeping Detroit on the Road to Prosperity, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1984, at 30, col. 4.
44 See Nanto, Automobiles Imported from Japan, Congressional Research Service Issue
Brief, Oct. 31, 1984, at 11.
45 See id at 9.
46 Id. at 1.
47 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982).
In order for the ITC to make an affirmative determination under section
201(b) (19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)), each of the following conditions must be met:
1. There are increased imports (either actual or relative to domestic
production) of an article into the United States;
2. The domestic industry producing an article like or directly competi-
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try.48 While finding that the auto industry was indeed experiencing
serious injury and that auto imports had increased, the ITC con-
cluded that the imports were not a "substantial cause" of serious in-
jury.49 The Commission found the injury due predominantly to
other factors, such as the shift in consumer demand to smaller cars
and the decline in overall demand attributable to the recessionary
economy. 50
An affirmative decision by the ITC would have granted the Pres-
ident authority to impose quotas, tariffs, or an orderly marketing
agreement if, in the President's discretion, such measures would be
in the economic interest of the United States.5 ' The ITC's negative
finding, however, took those options away from the President. 52
Therefore, the auto industry turned to Congress to accomplish legis-
latively what it could not accomplish administratively. Beginning in
February 1980 a number of auto trade bills were introduced in Con-
gress. Chief among these was the Danforth Bill,53 which would have
limited auto imports from Japan to 1.6 million units annually for
1981-1983. 54
The Reagan Administration opposed legislative restrictions on
auto imports, citing commitments to free trade and to the proce-
dures outlined in section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, as well as
concern that unilateral legislative action directed at one trading part-
ner would violate GATr.55 At the same time, the Administration
desired to stem the flow of auto imports and the protectionist tide
that the flow inspired.56
The solution agreed upon was to engage in discussions with the
Japanese in an effort to convince them to enact self-imposed re-
straints on shipments of cars to the United States.57 A group from
the United States Trade Representative's office flew to Japan to brief
tive with the imported article is being seriously injured, or threatened with
serious injury; and
3. Such increased imports of an article are a substantial cause of seri-
ous injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an arti-
cle like or directly competitive with the imported article.
deKieffer, supra note 8, at 60 n.7.
48 Id. at 59. The act defines "substantial cause" as a cause that is important and no
less important than any other cause. Id at 60 n.5.
49 Id at 60-61.
50 Id at 61.
51 Ribicoff, The U.S. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 8 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L L. 3, 6 (1982).
See also Trade Act of 1974, §§ 202(a)(l)(A), 203(a)(l)-(5), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(l)(A),
2253(a)(l)-(5) (1982).
52 Note, An Update of the Japanese Automobile Export Restraint, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
159, 167 (1982).
53 S. 396, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S1019 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1981).
54 Comment, supra note 4, at 439 n.71; deKieffer, supra note 8, at 61.
55 See deKieffer, supra note 8, at 61-62; Comment, supra note 4, at 439-44.
56 deKieffer, supra note 8, at 62.
57 See Note, supra note 52, at 168-69.
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the Japanese on steps being taken to aid the U.S. auto industry. 58
After several days of "talks" 59 the Japanese government announced
on May 1, 1981 that it had agreed to a three-year plan limiting auto
exports to the United States.6° Japan agreed to limit auto shipments
to the United States to 1.68 million units per year for the first year,
retroactive to April 1, 1981. The agreement limited exports in the
second year to the first-year limit, plus 16.5% of any increase in sales
of cars made in the United States. The agreement left the third year
open for renegotiation. 6'
On March 29, 1982, following a decline in U.S. domestic car
sales in 1981, Japan extended the 1.68 million unit ceiling for 1982-
1983; in February 1983 Japan extended the restrictions for a third
year.62 Following the lapse of the three-year agreement in 1984, re-
strictions were continued for a fourth year, but the import ceiling
was raised to 1.85 million units. 63
By March 1985 the U.S. auto industry was far healthier than it
had been in May 1981 when the voluntary restraints were imple-
mented. Profits of the big three auto makers set records in 1984.64
Employment was up, although due to productivity increases it ap-
peared unlikely to return to pre-1979 levels. 65 Citing the recovery of
the auto industry, the costs of import restrictions to consumers, and
a commitment to free trade which it hoped Japan would reciprocate,
the Reagan Administration announced on March 1, 1985 that it
would not seek a fifth year of voluntary restraint.°6
The end of voluntary quotas did not mean the end of restraint.
Even before the agreement expired, Japanese officials and auto exec-
utives acknowledged that their government's controls would con-
tinue.67 They worried that rapid growth in auto exports to the
United States above 1.85 million units per year would heighten trade
58 See id The Japanese believed that any effort on their part to help the U.S. auto
industry had to be preceded by a strong effort by U.S. automakers toward that same end.
Id at 170.
59 The Administration took great pains to characterize the sessions as informal dis-
cussions rather than negotiations, lest it appear to be demanding concessions that would
invite charges of protectionism. See deKieffer, supra note 8, at 62; Note, supra note 52, at
168-70.
60 Note, supra note 52, at 170.
61 Id.
62 Nanto, supra note 44, at 1.
63 See Kolen & Kanabayashi, Further Shortages ofJapanese.Made Cars into April 1985 Seen
in Wake of Export Pact, Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1983, at 3, col. 3. In the last year of the agree-
ment. 1.95 million Japanese cars were actually sold in the United States. Excess cars en-
tered the United States through Puerto Rico and other third-party territories, according to
the ITC. Auerbach & Brown, Brock Sees Jump in Japan Exports if Car Limits Lifted, Wash. Post,
Feb. 21, 1985, at El, col. 3.
64 See Auerbach, Reagan Won 't Ask Japan to Renew Quotas on Autos, Wash. Post. Mar. 2,
1985, at Al, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Reagan Won't Ask Japan].
65 See Berry, supra note 7, at Al, col. 5.
66 See Reagan Won't AskJapan. supra note 64, at A13, col. 4.
67 See Burgess, supra note 26, at Al, col. 5.
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tensions and encourage protectionist members of Congress. 68 Their
fears were well-founded, because many members of Congress op-
posed lifting restrictions 69 and later reacted strongly when Japan an-
nounced it would allow an increase of twenty-five percent, or
450,000 cars, over the total of the previous year.70
B. Restrictions on Imports of Steel
Like the automobile industry, steel production plays a major
role in the United States. Employment in the steel industry peaked
in 1974 at 609,000 people.7 1 A substantial number of workers in
other manufacturing sectors are directly affected by conditions in the
steel industry, whether as suppliers to steel producers or as users of
steel.72 Consequently, the industry contributes a considerable
amount to the Gross National Product.73
Based on differences in product mix and technology, the U.S.
steel industry is divided into three sectors: "integrated producers,
specialty steel producers, and minimills."174 As will be shown, each
sector faces different problems with foreign competition.
In 1959 steel imports into the United States exceeded exports
68 1d
69 Reagan Won't Ask Japan, supra note 64, at A13, col. 6.
70 See Auerbach, Japan Raises Ceiling on Auto Shipments to U.S. by 25 Pct., Wash. Post,
Mar. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 5. Within hours of the decision, the Senate, by a vote of 92-0,
passed a nonbinding resolution calling for retaliation againstjapanese trade practices. Six
days later the House of Representatives passed a similar measure. See Auerbach, Hill Inten-
sies Pressure on Trade, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1985, at Al, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Hill
Intensifies Pressure]. A bill that would require presidential retaliation against unfavorable
Japanese trade practices was approved by the Senate Finance Committee on April 2, 1985.
Senate leaders threatened to bring the bill back to the Senate floor for a vote if ongoing
trade talks did not bear fruit. Id
71 CONGRESSIoNAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF IMPORT QUOTAS ON THE STEEL
INDUSTRY 20 (July 1984) [hereinafter cited as CBO STUDY].
72 Id at 40.
73 In 1983 the steel industry produced 83 million tons of steel at the then-prevailing
domestic price of approximately $500 per ton, meaning that gross sales for the year to-
taled in the neighborhood of $41.5 billion. See id at 42.
74 Id at 3. "Integrated producers are the traditional core of the industry.... [Tlhey
typically own raw materials properties as well as transportation networks and some manu-
facturing operations that use steel." Id Steel is produced through a process that begins
with coke ovens and blast furnaces, then uses basic oxygen furnaces or open hearth fur-
naces, and finally rolls the steel into finished products. Id at 3, 61-62.
"Specialty-steel producers typically melt scrap in electric furnaces to produce alloy,
stainless and tool steels. These are higher-valued, technology-intensive products that are
gradually increasing as a share of total U.S. steel output." Id at 5. The sector includes a
large number of small, specialized producers, as well as most of the major integrated firms.
Id
Minimills recently have become important producers of steel. These mills melt scrap
in electric furnaces to produce carbon-grade steel, typically through a technologically ad-
vanced process called continuous casting. Minimills now comprise 20% of U.S. steel pro-
duction, and could grow to 35% by the year 2000. Because minimills generally produce
less sophisticated products, they are not yet a substitute for the integrated sector. Tech-
niques currently being developed, however, may allow minimills to compete directly with
integrated producers. See id at 6.
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for the first time this century. By 1968 imports approached seven-
teen percent of the domestic market. 75 In 1969 in response to indus-
try lobbying, the Nixon Administration negotiated voluntary
restraint agreements with Japan and the European Community. The
VRAs were renegotiated in 1972 and lasted a total of six years. 76
Between 1975 and 1978 import pressure eased a bit. "[N]o ex-
plicit restrictions limited carbon-steel imports, although quotas for
specialty-steel imports were in effect from 1976 to 1980." 77 When
imports rose again in 1978 to reclaim 18.1% of the domestic market,
the Carter Administration implemented the "trigger price mecha-
nism."78 "[T]he TPM established a fair import price, based onjapa-
nese costs plus an 8% markup for profit. 79 The TPM initially caused
a reduction in imports. By 1980, however, import penetration began
to increase again despite the TPM.80 Import growth was generated
through a combination of factors: greater concentration on the U.S.
market by foreign producers, rises in U.S. prices relative to import
prices, and increasing subsidization of steel production by foreign
governments.81 A greater concentration on the U.S. market by for-
eign producers, together with higher relative U.S. prices and the in-
creasing use of subsidies by other nations, combined by 1980 to
generate growth in import penetration despite the TPM.8 2
Taking matters into its own hands, the industry began filing an-
tidumping and countervailing duty83 cases with the ITC in March
1980. Upset by the industry's action, the Carter Administration
briefly suspended the TPM, but reinstated it in the fall of 1980. The
Reagan Administration finally eliminated the TPM in early 1982.84
Meanwhile, the industry continued to file massive numbers of coun-
tervailing duty cases, particularly against the EC.85 The EC cases
were dropped in the fall of 1982, when the EC agreed to voluntary
75 Id at 7.
76 Id In the industry's eyes, the VRAs were ineffective. Both the EC and Japan ex-
ceeded their quotas in 1971. Moreover, foreign producers shifted to higher-valued prod-
ucts to recoup some of what they lost by selling lower quantities. The industry lobbied for
greater restrictions until a world steel boom in 1973-1974 caused imports to fall of their
own accord. Id at 9.
77 Id at 9.
78 1d
79 Id The program assumed that Japanese production costs were the lowest in the
industry, and therefore, any producer selling below the TPM was of necessity "dumping"
steel. See id.
80 Id
81 Id
82 Id
83 For a detailed discussion of dumping and countervailing duty, see Ehrenhaff, An-
tidumping & Counervailing Duties, in ALI-ABA COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, IN-
TERNATIONAL T DE FOR THE NON-SPECIALIST 355-472 (1979).
84 See CBO STUDY, supra note 71, at 10. For a description of ITC procedures and
industry remedies in unfair trade cases, see Ribicoff, supra note 51, at 7-9.
85 CBO STUDY, supra note 71, at 10.
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restraints on steel exports to the United States.86 The domestic in-
dustry then focused its attention on Japan and the developing coun-
tries, filing still more unfair trade cases.8 7
While the unfair trade cases languished in the ITC, steel produ-
cers turned to section 201 of the Trade Act of 197488 as a means of
gaining restrictions on imported steel.89 These efforts were largely
successful. In a 1983 section 201 case initiated by specialty steel pro-
ducers, the ITC ruled that imports had caused serious injury to U.S.
producers.90 The Reagan Administration subsequently granted re-
lief in the form of quotas.9'
Bethlehem Steel and the United Steelworkers of America
brought an action before the ITC in January 1984, alleging serious
injury by imports in the carbon-steel industry.92 "On June 12,
[1984], the ITC ruled that U.S. producers had been injured by im-
ports in five of the nine product categories (accounting for 70% of
domestic shipments) raised in the ... case." 93 In July 1984 the ITC
recommended a combination of quotas and tariffs. 94
The Reagan Administration found itself in an uncomfortable po-
sition. Publicly committed to free trade, the President was con-
fronted with a statutory requirement that he decide within sixty days
either to implement the Commission's authoritative recommenda-
tions or find the recommendations not in the national interest.95
With the elections only six weeks away and considering the weight
carried by the ITC's decision, the U.S. steel industry was seemingly
assured of a favorable decision.
After long debate, the Administration chose what it considered a
middle course. The Administration announced on September 18,
1984, that it would seek to negotiate voluntary restraint agreements
with the major steel exporting nations, with the goal of holding im-
ports of finished steel to 18.5% of the domestic market.96 Imports
had been averaging 25% for the year.97 In return for the protection,
the steel industry agreed privately to refrain from filing new suits and
to withdraw its formal complaints, case by case, as foreign steel pro-
86 Id.
87 ld
88 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
89 CBO STUDY, supra note 71, at 10.
90 See Injury Found in Some Steel Imports, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1983, at Dl, col. 3.
91 See CBO STUDY, supra note 71, at 10.
92 Id.
93 Id
94 See Reagan Seeks Cut, supra note 6, at Al, col. 6.
95 Trade Act of 1974, § 202, 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (1982).
96 See Reagan Seeks Cut, supra note 6, at AI, col. 6; Pine, President Reects Makers' Bid for
New Quotas or Tariffs; Complaints to be Canceled, Wall St.J., Sept. 19, 1984, at 3, col. 1 [herein-
after cited as President Reects Makers' Bid].
97 Reagan Seeks Cut, supra note 6, at A l, col. 6.
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ducing countries entered into VRAs. 98
The Administration hoped to negotiate the agreements within
ninety days of the announcements. 99 Negotiations, however, lasted
longer than expected. By August 18, 1985, agreements had been
concluded with fourteen countries, while negotiations continued
with several others. 00
M. Effects of Restrictions on Imported Autos and Steel
A. Effect of Auto Restraints: 1981-1985
Voluntary restraints on Japanese auto exports became effective
in April 1981. The U.S. auto industry was suffering from record
losses and a massive decline in employment, production, and
sales. 10 At the same time, sales of Japanese cars were increasing
rapidly-Japan's share of the domestic new car market growing to
twenty-two percent in 1981.102 The principal reasons for the state of
the U.S. auto industry in 1981 include an increased demand for fuel
efficient foreign cars due to oil price rises in 1979-1980 and a de-
creased ability of U.S. auto manufacturers to compete with foreign
producers in quality, methods of production and price.' 03
By 1985 the domestic industry had vastly improved its pros-
pects. Profits for 1984 totaled $9.8 billion, 104 and sales and produc-
tion continued to be strong through the third quarter of 1985.105
Employment stood at 720,000, compared to a 1982 low of
623,000.10 6 The improvement even made one U.S. auto maker con-
98 President Rjects Makers' Bid, supra note 96, at 3, col. 1. "The industry had
threatened to file dozens, possibly even hundreds, of complaints that some feared would
wreak havoc on the trading system." Id
Despite the agreement not to file new unfair trade cases, some U.S. steelmakers con-
tinued to threaten such actions. Se, e.g., U.S. Steel Plans Cases, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1984,
at D12, col. 6. On December 19, 1984, U.S. Steel filed 28 actions against eight steel pro-
ducing countries. Pine, U.S. Sets Pacts to Curb Imports of Finished Steel, Wall St. J., Dec. 20,
1984, at 31, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Sets Pact].
99 President Reects Makers'Bid, supra note 96, at 3, col. 1.
100 Snags Cited in Quota Plan for Steel, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1985, at DI, col. 3. The
accords reached allowJapan a 5.8% market share; Korea, 1.9%; Brazil, .8%; Spain, .67%;
South Africa, .42%; Mexico, .36%; and Austria,. 18%. The 1982 pact with the EC remains
in force and limits European steel to 5.4%. Canada is expected to retain its current share
of 3%. U.S. Sets Pacts, supra note 98, at 31, col. 1.
101 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, A REVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S. AUTO-
MOBILE INDUSTRY INCLUDING AN ASSESSMENT OF THE JAPANESE VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT
AGREEMENTS, Feb. 1985, at I [hereinafter cited as ITC STUDY]. The industry lost $4 billion
in 1980. Employment fell from 929,000 to 740,000, and sales decreased from 9 million
units in 1978 to 6 million units in 1981. Id
102 Japan's share of sales grew from 11.9% in 1978 to 22% in 1981. lit
103 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
104 Nag & Kanabayashi,Japan's Export Increase Will Heighten Pressure on U.S. Auto Makers'
Profits, Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1985, at 2, col. 3.
105 See Guiles, Auto Makers' Net Seen Rising 8.556for Quarter, Wall St.J., Oct. 15, 1985, at
3, col. 1; Guiles, Car Production in 2nd Quarter is Seen Rising, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1985, at 8,
col. 4.
106 ITC STUDv, supra note 101, at vi.
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fident enough to call for an end to voluntary restraints. 10 7
In the interim, the industry drastically reduced its costs and im-
proved quality and efficiency through capital expenditures and re-
search and development.' 0l  Since larger cars generate higher
profits, producers benefitted from the increased demand for larger
cars that resulted from lower oil prices. The economic recovery
which began in 1982 also helped stimulate demand for U.S. autos.
The industry has also been assisted by Japan's voluntary re-
straints. The part that these restraints played in the industry's come-
back and the economic costs imposed by the agreement are
examined below.
Although the effect of the VRA was minimal in 1981, limits on
Japanese imports resulted in an estimated increase of 618,000 do-
mestic car sales by 1984.109 These car sales have generated greater
profits for auto companies" 0 and higher employment in the
industry. 1 I
The increased profits provided the auto companies with a source
of capital with which to invest in modernization and pay off large
debt holdings."l 2 Cost savings resulting from these expenditures
have been substantial.' 13 Further, the employment gains (an esti-
mated 44,000 jobs in auto production, many more in related indus-
tries)"14 provide a large benefit to the economy in general.
Restraints on Japanese auto imports, however, have proven
costly. Transaction prices of Japanese autos sold in the United
States averaged $1,300 more per car as a result of the VRA. l1 5
Prices on new U.S.-made cars were higher than they would have
been without the restraints by approximately $660 in 1984.116 The
ITC estimates total cost to consumers of the VRA from 1981 to 1984
107 See Smith, It's Time to End theAuto Quotas, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1985, at Aig, col. 1.
108 ITC STUDY, supra note 101, at 15. Among the cost-cutting measures used were
plant closings, wage and benefit concessions, and pressure on suppliers to decrease price
and increase quality. Changed methods of production, such as just-in-time inventory sys-
tems, increased outside purchasing, increased productivity, and management reorganiza-
tions, have also created cost savings. See id
109 Id at 38.
110 Id at 13.
111 The ITC estimates that VRAs are responsible for an extra 44,000 auto jobs. Id at
41. This estimate does not include job gains that may have been registered in steel or
other supplier industries. Id.
112 See id at 16.
113 Id Through major cost reductions, the big three auto producers substantially low-
ered their breakeven points during 1979-1984. GM's breakeven point dropped from 8.4
million units in 1980 to 5.6 million in 1984; Ford, from 3.6 million to 2.1 million; and
Chrysler, from 2.3 million to 1.1 million. Id. at 14.
114 See supra note 111.
115 ITC STUDY, supra note 101, at vi. Part of this increase resulted from the Japanese
having sold more expensive models during the VRA, and part was due to demand being
greater than supply. The ITC estimates that one million more Japanese cars could have
been sold in the United States in 1984 in the absence of restraints. Id at ix.
116 Id
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at $15.7 billion." 17
Restraints had other, less noticeable, effects. The U.S. trade
deficit for 1984, already at $125 billion, would have been $4 billion
higher without the restraints. 1 8 Restrictions may have kept the dol-
lar high, making U.S. products less competitive in relation to foreign
goods, therefore, indirectly causing the loss of some jobs in the
United States." 19
B. Probable Effects of VRAs on Steel Imports
A 1984 report by the Congressional Budget Office described the
state of the U.S. steel industry:
The industry is currently emerging from very depressed condi-
tions in 1982 and 1983, the worst years of the postwar era for U.S.
steel producers. In 1982, the industry operated at less than 50 per-
cent of capacity. Shipments and production were lower than at any
time since the late 1940s. These conditions precipitated substantial
layoffs and industrywide operating losses of about 2.5 billion. Pro-
duction increased somewhat in 1983 but not enough to offset the
1982 downturn. Financial losses continued at the 1982 pace, and
roughly 10 percent of the industry's capacity was permanently re-
tired. During 1983, the industry employed only 60 percent of the
labor force it had engaged in 1979. These conditions were exacer-
bated by record levels of import penetration, amounting to over 22
percent of domestic steel consumption in 1982 and over 20 percent
in 1983.
The industry showed significant improvement in the first few
months of 1984, and most steel firms are likely to be marginally
profitable in this year. But employment has not increased greatly
and imports continue to claim roughly 25 percent of the U.S.
market. 120
The industry's prospects were not, however, uniformly bleak.
[The brunt of the 1982-83 downturn was borne by the inte-
grated producers, such as the United States Steel Corporation and
Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Although these firms have tradition-
ally dominated the industry, their market share has been shrinking
since at least 1960. In contrast, minimills have increased their share
of domestic steel production from about 3 percent in 1960 to almost
20 percent today. These firms, which use a different technology,
have been highly profitable and highly competitive against both do-
mestic integrated and foreign producers. While minimills were ad-
versely affected by recent weak market conditions, the long term
prospects for this sector are good. Minimills provide the clearest
evidence that the industry is undergoing a significant restructuring
rather than a uniform decline. They are particularly well adapted to
the underlying forces that have shaped the U.S. steel market during
the postwar period: relatively slow growth in domestic steel con-
sumption, significant technological changes, and the gradual shift of
117 lId
118 Id at x.
119 Id at ix.
120 CBO STUDY, supra note 71, at xv.
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global steel production and consumption away from the United
States. 121
The domestic industry's current problems stem not from unfair
foreign competition, but from three more fundamental trends.
"First, as a mature economy, the United States has been consuming
less steel per dollar of GNP than have economies that are at earlier
stages of maturity."' 22 Second, domestic industry lags both in the
technology of production and in the implementation of more effi-
cient production methods. 12 Finally, production and consumption
are shifting to developing countries, where "low employment costs
combined with advanced technology" make for tough competi-
tion. 1 24 The U.S. steel industry needs to adapt to these trends. Vol-
untary restraints should be implemented only if they can succeed in
easing the transition to a leaner, more flexible, and more technologi-
cally advanced industry.
The primary effect of restrictions would be a rise in the price of
both domestic and imported steel, resulting in lower consump-
tion. 12 5 Because demand for steel is relatively inelastic, the increase
in domestic steel employment and profits would outweigh any losses
that might result from decreased consumption. 12 6
Long-term effects on the steel industry depend on whether the
quota-induced profits are invested in modernizing production or are
channeled into other steel company investments or into wage in-
creases. Many fear that protection will only serve to remove steel
industry incentives to become more competitive. These analysts
note that while the industry has promised since 1968 to use protec-
tions as a temporary shield during which modernizations will take
place, capital expenditures for new plant and equipment during that
period have declined. 12 7
Even assuming that steel makers invested all their profits in
modernizing plants and equipment, the extra profits generated by
VRAs-might not provide the industry with sufficient capital to meet
their needs. A number of studies estimate steel industry capital
121 I at xv-xvi.
122 Id. at 32. The CBO study noted three primary reasons for steel intensity declines
in mature economies: (1) large investments in steel intensive infrastructure already have
been made; (2) high technology material uses less steel; and (3) service industries tend to
grow in relation to manufacturing industries as economies mature. Id. See also O'Boyle,
Domestic Prices Seen Boosted as Some Funds Are Raised for Investments in Plants, Wall St. J., Sept.
19, 1984, at 3, col. 3.
123 CBO STUDY, supra note 71, at 33. Minimills do not suffer from this problem. l at
33-34.
124 Il at 34. For example, Pohang Steel of South Korea has a $22 per ton labor cost
compared to a U.S. average of $150 per ton. O'Boyle, supra note 122, at 3, cols. 5-6.
125 CBO STUDY, supra note 71, at 39-40. Experts predict a 6-7% increase in steel
prices as a result of VRAs. See O'Boyle, supra note 122, at 3, col. 4.
126 CBO STUDY, supra note 71, at 40.
127 Effect Similar to Quotas, supra note 9, at D19, col. 3.
1986]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
needs at $5.5 billion to $6.5 billion per year; industry investment has
averaged only $2.2 billion since 1980.128
A Congressional Budget Office study found that a 15% quota on
steel imports would add $1.5 billion to $2 billion (in 1983 dollars)
yearly to the cash flow of steel manufacturers.' 29 The VRAs cur-
rently being negotiated, which would hold imports to 18.5% of do-
mestic sales, would raise cash flow by an amount lower than the 15%
quota. Assuming a $1.5 billion increase in cash flow, added to the
$2.2 billion in investment expenditures which the industry has been
averaging, the industry would still suffer a capital shortfall of $1.8
billion to $2.8 billion. What these figures suggest is that the steel
industry will remain uncompetitive even after the VRA.
Import restrictions are often defended as a means of protecting
domesticjobs. The effect of steel VRAs on overall U.S. employment,
however, could result in a loss ofjobs. Restraints could result in the
eventual recall of as many as 25,000 steel workers, or one-fourth of
those presently laid off.' 3 0 The higher steel prices, however, will
have a negative impact on industries which consume large amounts
of steel, particularly those that face stiff foreign competition. 13' Esti-
mates show that the U.S. auto industry is already at a $150 per car
disadvantage to foreign auto manufacturers due to higher steel
prices.' 3 2 Restraints exacerbate these cost-control problems, and
could cost many more jobs than are gained, through the decrease in
demand for more expensive finished products and through a shifting
of production overseas.' 3 3
As noted previously, restraints on steel imports will lead to an
increase in steel prices. These higher prices will come from the
pockets of manufacturers who rely on steel purchases. In the short-
run, the price increases will result in losses of capital to these manu-
facturers. The increased costs will ultimately be passed on to con-
sumers in the form of higher prices for finished goods. Conversely,
the price increases will generate a windfall to steel producers in the
form of higher revenues than would be earned in the absence of
restrictions.
Thus, import restrictions on steel would amount to a transfer of
income from those bearing the burden of higher steel prices (manu-
128 CBO STUDY, supra note 71, at 48. Some of the studies were conducted by groups
representing or favorable to the steel industry (e.g., the American Iron and Steel Institute
and the Steel Tripartite Commission). Id.
129 Id. at 51.
130 O'Boyle, supra note 122, at 3, col. 4.
131 Id.
132 See Farnsworth, Effects of Cut in Steel Import, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1984, at D16, col. 1
[hereinafter cited as Effects of Cut].
133 "Caterpillar Tractor. . . has said that restrictions on foreign steel might force the
company to close U.S. operations in favor of plants overseas with access to cheaper steel."
O'Boyle, supra note 122, at 3, col. 4.
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facturers and ultimate consumers) to foreign 13 4 and domestic produ-
cers.13 5 Further, voluntary restraints would impose efficiency losses
on the U.S. economy, because U.S. resources would have to be di-
verted from other uses to produce steel that could have been
purchased at lower cost from foreign producers. 3 6 Costs to the
economy from income transfers and efficiency losses would total ap-
proximately $4 billion per year.' 3 7
IV. Voluntary Restraints: Lessons of the Steel and Auto Cases
The United States has utilized voluntary restraint agreements as
a tool in foreign trade policy for over thirty years.' 3 8 In recent years
VRAs have become a major, if not the predominant, form of import
restriction used by the United States. Labeled the "new protection-
ism," ' 3 9 VRAs currently apply to a wide array of products, including
tiles, bicycles, metal tableware, baseball gloves, umbrellas,' 40 beef,
footwear, ball bearings, batteries, dairy products, mushrooms, cof-
fee, television sets, textiles and tin.141 These import restrictions cost
consumers incalculable billions of dollars each year and reduce the
efficiency of the economy.' 42 VRAs save jobs in protected indus-
tries, but can result in increased unemployment for the nation as a
whole, reduce industry incentives to become competitive, and even-
tually leave the protected industry less able to compete than before
restrictions. ' 43
An example of a VRA that will likely have a negative overall im-
pact is one in the steel industry. Profound changes are taking place
in the steel industry. Demand for steel is leveling off. The tradi-
tional producer, the huge integrated manufacturer, can no longer
compete economically with smaller, more flexible and technologi-
cally advanced producers, especially those with low labor costs. In-
stead of easing the transition to this new reality in steel production,
import restrictions likely will delay the process, meanwhile costing
134 CBO STUDY, supra note 71, at 45-46.
135 CBO STUDY, supra note 71, at 44-47.
136 Income transferred to foreign producers would equal the payments made by U.S.
consumers minus the price they would have paid absent restrictions. lId at 44-45. Foreign
companies also could increase profits by exporting more expensive grades of steel, a tactic
used successfully by Japanese auto producers. See Effects of Cut, supra note 132, at D16, col.
3.
137 See CBO STUDY, supra note 71, at 47. This study estimated a $4.8 billion yearly cost
resulting from a 1576 quota. The 18.5% limit sought by the Reagan Administration would
result in somewhat lower income transfers.
138 See Comment, supra note 4, at 434.
159 See Munger, supra note 6, at A21, col. 1.
140 Comment, supra note 4. at 434 n.24.
141 Munger, supra note 6. at A21, col. 1.
142 See id.
143 See id.
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consumers billions of dollars and hurting the competitiveness of
steel-consuming manufacturers.
The case of the auto industry, by contrast, demonstrates that
VRAs can be used to restore vigor to an ailing industry. In 1980-
1981 the U.S. auto industry stood at the brink of disaster. Four years
of restrictions later, U.S. automakers, while not completely out of the
woods, have shown an adaptability to new market conditions that few
envisioned. New methods of production, higher technology, in-
creased productivity, and a greater devotion to quality and consumer
desires make the auto industry better able to compete in the domes-
tic market. Events of the next few years will determine whether the
industry can compete successfully in an open market. Without the
protection provided between 1981 and 1985 by the VRA with Japan,
domestic manufacturers might not have had the opportunity.
If, as experience has shown, VRAs can harm or benefit the na-
tion depending on the circumstances, how are policymakers to de-
cide in advance which industries to protect through VRAs and which
to leave unprotected? The lessons of the auto and steel VRAs sug-
gest a number of factors decision makers should consider.
First and foremost, policymakers should consider the likelihood
that the protected industry will eventually recover to compete effec-
tively without import restriction. If an industry needs protection in-
definitely in order to survive, it makes no economic sense for
consumers to subsidize an inefficient producer, and, absent good na-
tional security justifications, protection should not be undertaken. 1 "
The threshold question, then, is whether the industry, given a tem-
porary breathing space, can compete in an open market.
The second factor for consideration, the effect of a VRA on the
economy, may be divided into two parts. First, the overall effect of
protection on employment or the potential impact of inaction on em-
ployment must be examined. Second, the cost of VRAs to consum-
ers, in the form of higher prices and lost efficiency, must be
estimated and balanced against the net effect on employment. A
small net gain in overall employment could be outweighed by a large
cost to consumers, while a large gain in employment coupled with
relatively small consumer costs would militate in favor of protection.
Third, decision makers should analyze proposed VRAs for their
effects on the nation or nations against which they are directed and
on the world trading system generally. Where the threat of retalia-
tion of a general trade war is high and potential negative effects on
U.S. employment and production of such retaliation greater, the
144 National security should be considered, but, in the author's opinion, protection
should only be undertaken to the extent necessary to preserve the productive capability
required in the event of mobilization. Any amount above that which would be needed in
wartime should come from the most efficient producer.
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United States should be wary of negotiating voluntary restraints.1 45
There are times, however, when this factor will weigh in favor of
VRAs: when restraints are used to break down foreign barriers to
U.S. goods 146 or to ward off protectionist clamoring in the Con-
gress. 147 Moreover, because VRAs are not outlawed by GATT,148
the effects of voluntary restraints on world trade relations will gener-
ally be less detrimental to trade relations than other forms of
restriction.
Analyzed using these factors, restraints on Japanese auto im-
ports were probably justified. Steel VRAs, conversely, will likely
prove unjustified.
In 1981, the auto industry was wounded, but not terminally so.
Possessing enormous assets and great technological capabilities, the
industry did have the potential to eventually compete on an even
footing with Japanese producers. The number of jobs saved by im-
ports was relatively small, 149 but the potential loss if the industry
failed to survive was great indeed. 150 The long-term benefit to the
U.S. economy of a healthy auto industry outweighed the temporary,
albeit substantial, costs of import restrictions borne by U.S. consum-
ers. Analyzing the third factor with respect to auto restraints, the
balance again favored restrictions. Japan did not retaliate against the
restrictions151 and the world trading system felt no significant reper-
cussions. Moreover, support for protectionist legislation in Con-
gress that could have invited retaliation faded following the restraint
agreement. 152
The steel industry probably cannot pass the threshold test of be-
ing able to return eventually to an unprotected market. 153 Assuming
that it can, quotas would likely cost more jobs to the U.S. economy
than they would protect in the steel industry because so many indus-
tries depend on low steel prices to compete in the marketplace. Po-
tential loss of employment in the absence of voluntary restrictions,
could be offset by a shift in production to minimills. Finally, the re-
145 See Pine, Threat of a Trade War Rises as Recession Spurs Competition, Nations Impose Curbs,
Wall St.J., Nov. 17, 1982, at 56, col. 1.
146 See Pine, Administration Hopes Auto-Quota End Will Help in Trade Talks with Japan, Wall
St.J., Mar. 4, 1985, at 18, col. 1.
147 See President Rejects Makers' Bid, supra note 96, at 26, col. 3.
148 See Munger, supra note 6, at A21, col. 1. VRAs do, however, sometimes provoke
retaliation. See Auerbach, Retaliation Threatened on Steel Curb, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1984, at
C 1, col. 3.
149 Approximately 44,000 jobs were saved by voluntary restraints according to the
ITC. See supra note 128. See also Pine, Quotas on Autos fromJapan Said to Lift U.S. Prices, Wall
St. J., Feb. 14, 1985, at 3, col. 3.
150 See Note, supra note 30, at 299.
151 This fact is not surprising, considering that Japan let in few U.S. goods to begin
with. See Hill Intensifies Pressure, supra note 70.
152 See Note, supra note 52, at 171.
153 See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
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straints have had a negative effect on trade relations with exporting
countries. Negotiation of the limits has been marked by animosity
and threats of retaliation.'" Unlike the auto situation, where there
was little chance thatJapan would retaliate against its most important
trading partner, trade friction will likely arise from steel restraints.
V. Conclusion
Voluntary restraint agreements have developed into the pre-
ferred form of protectionism in the United States. The trend will
likely continue, given an Administration publicly committed to free
trade but mindful of pressure from numerous manufacturing indus-
tries facing import competition.
The foregoing analysis of auto and steel VRAs indicates that the
benefits of VRAs vary among industries. Because of the potentially
great costs of VRAs to consumers and to the economy, the United
States should conduct a thorough analysis of the viability of volun-
tary restraints for each industry in which such limits are considered.
Only when the industry has a reasonable chance for a successful re-
covery should the industry receive protection. Where recovery is
possible, a cost-benefit analysis for the economy as a whole should
be undertaken and considered in conjunction with the projected im-
pact of restrictions on international trade relations. Only after a
careful weighing of these factors should the United States seek vol-
untary restraints on imports.
-MICUAEL M. DJAVAHERIAN*
154 See npra notes 125-47 and accompanying text.
* J.D. 1986, Georgetown University Law Center.
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